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Abstract In this chapter I aim to explain how psychology understands concepts,
and why there is a need for semantic theory to take on the challenge of psycho-
logical data. All of the contributors to this volume are (presumably) in the business
of trying to understand and explain how language has meaning, and the primary
source of evidence for this has to be our intuitions of what things mean. Further-
more, if my semantic intuitions (as a theorist) are out of kilter with those of the
common language user, then it is my theory which should be called into question
and not the lay intuition. This chapter describes a range of results from my research
program over the last 30 years, some old and some new, with the aim of giving a
general account of using Prototype Theory as a way to explain semantic intuitions.
1 Concepts and Prototypes
In The Compositionality Papers, Fodor and Lepore (2002) return frequently to a
“knock-down” argument against the suggestion that concepts might be prototypes.
Concepts, they argue, must be compositional. It must be possible, if one accepts the
representational theory of mind, to explain how the meaning of a complex phrase is
based solely on the meaning of the elements from which it is constructed, plus the
syntactic structure into which they are placed. To account for our ability to
understand the meaning of sentences such as (1) and (2) and countless other similar
sentences the semantic system needs a set of fixed symbols to represent the con-
ceptual atoms in the sentences (John, Mary, Bill, loves, hates) which can then be
inserted into suitable syntactically structured sentence frames to yield the appro-
priate meaning for the sentence as a whole.
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(1) John loves Mary.
(2) John loves Mary, but Mary loves Bill and Mary hates John.
They claim that without this type of compositionality it is not possible to provide
an account of how thoughts (and indeed utterances) can express ideas.
Given the claim that concepts must be compositional, the argument continues
that prototypes are in fact anything but compositional. For example, the proto-
typical pet fish is not simply the prototype pet conjoined with the prototype fish.
Indeed something like a goldfish or guppy, while being a good match for the pet
fish prototype, has little in common with the cats and dogs that are typical pets, or
the cod and trout that are typical fish (Osherson and Smith 1981).
More generally, the prototype of any particular complex noun phrase (should it
have one) will not be derivable from the prototypes of the content words of which it
is composed. Hence concepts (which must be compositional) cannot be prototypes
(which are often non-compositional).
The debate on compositionality has generated a large literature in semantics and
philosophy—see for example the substantial collection of papers edited by
Werning et al. (2012) For critical accounts on whether language is in fact com-
positional, particularly in respect of the systematicity of its grammar, see Johnson
(2004) and Pullum and Scholz (2007). As Pelletier (2017) remarks, the issue
probably represents one of the most substantial points of disagreement within
cognitive science between the more empirically minded psychologists and linguists
who study concepts and word meanings “in the mind”, language in use, and lay
people’s semantic intuitions, and the more theoretically minded semanticists and
philosophers whose interests cover broader issues of concepts as constituting lexical
meanings within a particular language, and issues of sentential truth and logic.
(Like Pelletier, I am speaking generically here).
As an empirical researcher into word meanings, I find myself strongly drawn to
the conclusion that lexical meanings do not compose according to the rules of set
logic applied to extensions. That is to say that the meaning of a complex phrase will
not always be determined simply by the meanings of its components and their mode
of combination. I will argue that the construction of complex concepts proceeds
(most naturally) through the interactive combination of the intensional meanings of
the individual concepts. Wherever two concepts are combined whose intensional
contents overlap or interact semantically, then extensional compositionality of
meaning will tend to fail. Moreover, if we consider thought rather than language,
our capacities to combine concepts greatly exceed the simple combinatorial rules




A key piece of evidence for proposing that the category membership of complex
concepts depends on more than their components and their mode of combination
comes from a series of experiments that I and others conducted in the 1980s and
1990s. To illustrate, in Hampton (1988b, Experiments 2 and 3) I looked at how
people interpret the phrases “Sports which are Games”, or “Games which are
Sports”. These phrases were chosen because (at least at first sight) a standard
semantic analysis would see the meaning as being a conjunction—that is the ex-
tension of both phrases should correspond quite simply to the intersection of the set
of Games and the set of Sports. The two alternative phrasings come at the inter-
section in different ways (either finding the subset of sports that are also games, or
vice versa) but the result should be the same.
To test this standard proposal, I provided 36 respondents with a list of 43
recreational activities selected to fall in all four possible combinations of being
Sports or not, and being Games or not. Their first task was to judge whether each
item was a Sport (together with a rating of degree of typicality or relatedness) and
then to judge whether each item was a Game. (Order of tasks was balanced over
subjects). Four weeks later the same individuals returned and decided which items
were in one or other of the conjunctions mentioned above.
Based purely on their true/false judgments of “whether the general category
name can be applied to a particular example”, the data were analysed to see whether
in fact people followed an intersective rule, only saying Yes to the conjunction for
those items (like Tennis or Football) where they had said Yes to both conjuncts.
The results were very clear. People did not follow this rule. In fact 25% of games
that were not sports, and 54% of sports that were not games, according to first week
responses, were nevertheless categorized in the conjunction on week 4. This
overextension was not attributable to a contrast effect between the categories, nor to
randomness in people’s choices, since the equivalent inconsistent pattern of saying
No to an item that had been judged as in both sets was much less frequent (11%).
A further study showed that the effect was not driven by a response bias, since
adding in new items to the list for the second phase so that the expected rate of Yes
responses for the conjunction would be 50% (rather than 25%) had no influence on
the rate of overextension of the other items.
A final experiment in this paper showed that the effect generalized to six other
pairs of categories, including pets which are birds and dwellings which are build-
ings. Regression analysis was applied to predicting the mean degree of membership
in the conjunction from means for each conjunct. Including an interaction term, on
average 93% of the variance in mean membership ratings for the conjunction was
explained. The analyses also showed that the relative clause form is
non-commutative (for example, weapons which are tools are not equivalent to tools
which are weapons) and that one of the two concepts often carries more weight in
the prediction than the other (a phenomenon termed dominance).
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Subsequent research has shown that this lack of respect for the conjunction rule
is easily replicated across a range of domains and linguistic ways of expressing a
conjunction (Storms et al. 1998; Hampton 1996; Jönsson 2015). It can be shown
with the same individual making all three judgments, or with different individuals
making each judgment. It also appears when the relative clause is negated. For
example, a horse is not often considered to be a vehicle, but it is frequently con-
sidered to be a vehicle that is not a machine. Hampton (1988a) showed that the
problem of non-extensional combination applies equally to disjunctions. A mush-
room is never classed as a fruit, and only 50% of respondents called it a vegetable.
However 90% decided that it was either a fruit or a vegetable.
The challenge of these results to extensional theories of semantics should be
clear. These results do not just depend on judgments of typicality or even judgments
of degrees of truth which might be subject to psychological biases (Osherson and
Smith 1981, 1982). They simply reflect the common semantic intuitions of
everyday language speakers about the applicability of complex phrases, and as such
they require an explanation.
1.2 Intensional Composition
The account of overextension that I offered in Hampton (1987) was a relatively
straightforward explanation based on the intensional properties of the concepts
involved.
Classically speaking, when a complex concept is constructed as a conjunction,
then the features that define it intensionally will be derived in a compositional
fashion as a disjunction of the features of the two conjuncts. For example, to form
the conjunction of people who are both singers and songwriters, one would look to
set up a categorization procedure that would require potential candidates to have the
union of the features of each set (person AND singer AND songwriter). To model
the combination of categories such as Sports and Games, one can simply propose
that Sports which are also Games should therefore be a composite prototype
resulting from aggregating all the features commonly associated with either of the
two conjuncts. As Sports they should be activities which involve exercise and
training and as Games they should also involve competition and fun.
Most importantly, this way of modelling the construction of a conjunctive
concept provides a neat explanation of why people are inconsistent in judging
extensions of conjunctions. Consider the case where there are two prototype con-
cepts A and B, each with 3 features. In line with Rosch’s idea of family resemblance
and prototypes, let us suppose that any item will belong in either concept if it has at
least 2 of the 3 features of that concept.
Table 1 shows the resulting composite, in which the conjunction A^B is created
with all six features in its prototype. Now if having 2 out of 3 features is sufficient to
belong in either of the two concepts A or B, then it is natural to suggest that 4 out of
6 features should be sufficient to belong in their conjunction. Accordingly, Item 1
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which has 2 of each of the concept’s features should belong in the conjunction.
However Item 2, which has 3 A features but only 1 B feature, passes the criterion
for belonging in the conjunction, but fails to have enough features to be an example
of Concept B. The result is that Item 2 would be overextended—it would belong in
the conjunction but not in one of the conjuncts. Effectively, pooling together the
features, even before any interaction between them has been considered (resulting
in inheritance failure or the addition of new emergent features, see below), leads to
the likelihood of inconsistent responding and overextension.
Hampton (1987) collected data on the attributes associated with each of the
conjuncts and their conjunction for the same pairs of categories as were used in
Hampton (1988b) described above, and traced the way in which attributes for the
composite prototype are derived from the constituent components. The procedure
involved two separate samples of participants. A first sample was divided into four
groups. For a pair of concepts such as Sports and Games, group 1 listed attributes
for Sports, group 2 for Games, group 3 for “Sports that are also Games” and group
4 for “Games that are also Sports”. They were asked to imagine that they had to
define and describe the objects named to someone who was unfamiliar with them.
They were to do this by listing on 10 blank lines the attributes or properties that
were in any way involved in deciding if an object belongs in the named set. (Full
details can be found in Hampton 1987, p. 58). Lists of around 30 attributes for each
pair of concepts were then drawn up by including any attribute generated by at least
3 out of 10 participants in any of the four groups.
A second sample of participants was then used to judge the attributes for how
important they were for defining each concept and each conjunction. The sample
was divided into four groups exactly as before, but now each participant saw the list
of attributes and made a rating judgment. “N” was to be chosen as a response if an
Table 1 A scheme for aggregating the attributes of two concepts A and B into a conjunctive
concept A^B. If a “two out of three” rule is used to determine category membership, then Item 1
will be a member of A, B and of the conjunction. However Item 2 will be a member of A and of
the conjunction, but will not be a member of category B, having only one of the b attributes. The
model predicts overextension of the conjunction through compensation (an excellent member of A
can be in the conjunction A^B although only weakly connected to B)
Concept A Conjunction A^B Item 1 Item 2
a1 a1 a1 a1
a2 a2 a2 a2
a3 a3 - a3
b1 b1 b1
Concept B b2 b2 -
b1 b3 - -
b2
b3
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attribute was necessary for a category, responses “A”, “B” and “C” were used to
indicate decreasing importance (A = very important, C = typically true but not
very defining), “X” meant the attribute was not usually true, and “XX” meant the
attribute was necessarily false of all possible examples of the concept. The results
from this rating task were then used to assess how attributes of conjuncts are
inherited by their conjunctions.
There were many interesting aspects to the results which I will not try to
summarize here. As predicted, importance for a conjunct could be used to predict
importance for a conjunction (Multiple R averaged around 0.8, close to the relia-
bility of the scales at 0.85). The process is analogous to one of inherited traits, with
traits possessed by both parent concepts being carried through to the offspring
conjunction. Most notably there were some attributes which failed to be “inherited”
by the composite, and others that “emerged” in the composite which were not in the
constituents. Pets which are Birds, for example, lost some features of pets (cuddly)
and some features of birds (fly south in winter), but gained other new features not
seen in either concept alone such as (lives in cages) or (talks).
1.3 Prototypes as Intensions
I have argued that the way in which people interpret simple semantic rules such as
relative clause modification can be accurately modelled by a deeper analysis of the
intensional meaning of the words. What is the evidence then that such intensions
have the prototype structure that leads to the patterns of overextension seen above?
If we consider most common content words in natural language—nouns, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs—then it is often the case that neither the extension nor the
intension are easy to pin down. The meaning of function words like prepositions is
even harder. Consider for example the following common uses of “on” in English:
(3) The cup is on the table.
(4) I got paint on my shirt.
(5) Harry is on holiday.
(6) The train is on platform 2.
Any attempt to define the extension of situations to which “on” applies is likely
to end up simply as a disjunctive list of different cases. The fact that prepositions do
not easily translate between languages supports this claim (Bowerman and Choi
2003a, b). When I told a French friend that I had travelled to Paris “sur le train”, the
puzzled response was to ask if it wasn’t very windy sitting on the roof. Similar
problems arise with adjectives such as “fresh” or “open” (Murphy and Andrew
1993), with multiple inter-related senses determined by context. For further dis-
cussion see Rice (1992).
Returning to the (perhaps) simpler case of nouns, consider a simple everyday
term such as “fish”. First there is a potential ambiguity arising from the domain of
discourse. Fish features in cookery and food and as such its extension may include
creatures such as squid, oysters and lobsters. Fish is also part of a commercial
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industry, exploiting marine resources, and in the past the category extension
included whales. Finally, fish may be taken to have a biological meaning. Unfor-
tunately, those who pin their hopes on science to identify the “correct” extensional
class, are due to be disappointed. Current scientific theory suggests there is no
common ancestor to the different classes that we call fish. The term describes a
disjunctive category with no role to play in biological theory. Thus, not only do we
have these three different ways to place the term in context, but within each context
the determination of what is in the extension becomes equally problematic. Should
shell-fish be included in the culinary term—what about seahorses, rays or squid?
The term is underspecified, as the psychological data clearly show (Hampton 1998;
Hampton et al. 2006; McCloskey and Glucksberg 1978).
Since intensions are closely tied to extensions, it is not surprising to find that the
intensional definitions of terms are equally difficult to pin down. Most ency-
clopaedia entries will state that all fish are cold-blooded. However, they then go on
to say that some fish (like tuna) are not. It has proved very difficult to provide clear
definitions for most of our vocabulary terms. There always seem to be exceptions.
Exceptions to the rule that there are always exceptions may be found when a
concept has a particularly important role to play in the regulation of society. Then it
will often be found to have an explicit definition. The definition of a “US dollar” or
“British citizen” has a legal foundation which leads to a clear-cut differentiation into
members and non-members of the class.
A slightly less clear example is provided by certain kinship terms, like “father”
or “nephew” in English which are often found to be amenable to an analysis in
terms of semantic components. As Goodenough (1965) describes it
A system of kin relationships rests on the established institutions and customs relating to
membership in households, sexual rights, the definition of procreation, the legitimization of
progeny as members of a jural community and the like.
In relation to “grandmother” Landau (1982) showed how both a definitional
criterion (female having a grandchild) and a stereotypical age and appearance are
seen in responses for both children and adults when selecting appropriate pictures.
Even when kinship terms such as “uncle” are extended to non-blood relations we
are able to distinguish a “real” uncle from other kinds of uncle. On the other hand,
the development of non-traditional families has led to the undermining of many
kinship terms (see Lakoff’s 1987, discussion of “mother”), and terms such as
“brothers” and “sisters” can be used with extended meaning to refer to others who
share the speaker’s beliefs, goals or group membership.
Terms describing crimes (such as murder, theft, or fraud) are likewise provided
with definitions by the legislature of each jurisdiction, so that juries can focus on
establishing the facts of a case based on the evidence, rather than having to decide
how to interpret the meaning of the words. (The latter task is left to judges in higher
courts who aim to establish stable interpretations of the terms through reasoned
argument about test cases and guessing the plausible intention of the law-makers).
However, when a concept does not have this consequential weight resting upon it, it
will usually resist easy definition.
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The lack of a clear definition where one is needed can lead to expensive court
cases, as the following extract from an article by Caroline Davies in the UK
newspaper The Guardian of 27 April, 2015, shows:
Bridge, the genteel and physically unchallenging card game played by millions, may
exercise the brain muscle, but is it a sport? That is the question taxing legal minds as a high
court ruling on Monday paved the way for a courtroom battle to decide. The row centres on
a refusal by Sport England to recognise the trick-taking game as a legitimate sport and thus
eligible for lottery grants. The English Bridge Union claim it ought to be recognised as a
“mind sport” and want Sport England’s refusal to do so declared unlawful.
Arguments presented to the court included the amount of physical activity in-
volved (compared for example to rifle shooting), the health benefits of taking part,
and the fact that other physical activities are not classified as sports. It was clear that
lawyers on each side were seeking to find a plausible definition (intension) that
would enable them to either include or exclude bridge from the category containing
clear examples of sport such as tennis or football. (What is less clear is why the
judge was willing to entertain the argument that the brain is a muscle!)
The issues involved here can be related to two fundamental issues in semantics
—context sensitivity and vagueness. Perhaps the lack of clearly specified meanings
of terms, and the consequent inconsistency in semantic intuitions results from the
lack of a clear context. Alternatively, the difficulty of providing clear meanings may
in fact result from those meanings being inherently unclear or vague, in the same
way that scalar adjectives such as “tall” or “bald” have been shown to lack
precision.
1.4 Context Sensitivity
The meanings of terms can change depending on context. Classic examples are
scalar adjectives—a large ant is not as big as a small elephant. Alternatively, there
is the example of fish described above, and the different contexts in which the term
might be used.
But can context sensitivity fully explain the difficulty in defining extensions and
intensions? In an attempt to find evidence for this suggestion, Hampton et al. (2006)
ran a set of studies in which we manipulated the context in which people had to
classify items in vague categories. We used eight different categories from different
ontological domains, and created lists of 24 possible members in which we
deliberately included clear cases, clear non-members of the category and about 12
cases that would be difficult to categorise. (The existence of borderline cases in
natural categories was originally demonstrated by McCloskey and Glucksberg
1978, when they showed that not only were there many items showing substantial
disagreement between people, but that people were also inconsistent in how they
categorized those same items when returning a month later to do the task again.)
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Our hypotheses for the study related to the idea that apparent vagueness in the
category boundaries can be attributed to a lack of a clear context for the classifi-
cation. We therefore had three main conditions in which we provided different
contexts for the categorization. The first was a Neutral control condition which
simply asked “Consider each of the following items and decide whether they
belong in the category of _____”. A second condition, the Pragmatic condition,
asked people to categorize items in categories “where people would expect to find
them, so that they could be easily found”. Scenarios included an internet news
group, a mail-order catalogue and a library index. Here we hoped to reduce
vagueness because everyone would be attempting to mirror the behaviour of
everyone else in the group. The third condition, the Technical condition, provided a
set of contexts much like the case of Bridge and Sport described above. People were
asked to imagine that they were advising a government agency controlling tax
regimes (for Tools and Furniture), ecological reports (for Insects and Fish) or
funding agencies (for Science and Sport). They were told that the classification
would have important consequences and so they should try to classify “correctly”.
Participants worked through each list classifying items as Yes or No, and
returned after 3–4 weeks to do the task again in the same condition as before.
Our prediction was that if lack of categorization context was contributing to
vagueness, then various measures of vagueness would be reduced in the Technical
and Pragmatic conditions. There should be better inter-subject agreement on clas-
sification, more stability in categorization decisions over time, a reduced correlation
of categorization probability with simple ratings of Typicality, and a shift in the size
of the categories, with Technical conditions yielding smaller categories. In the
event, none of these predictions was generally supported by the data. Effectively
categorization probability in all conditions was correlated at around 0.95 (the limit
of measurement reliability) with judgments of item typicality in the category.
A second study showed that requiring people to read the instructions aloud and
reflect on them before starting to categorize had no effect on the results. There was
no easily accessible “deeper” meaning for people to describe if asked to take the
task more seriously. Finally, we looked at whether people would be less likely to
give a “partial” or graded response in the Technical condition. In this last study,
people were given a graded categorization scale to use running from not at all
through barely, sort of and very much, to completely. If people felt that a category
has a clear definition (even if they are uncertain what it is), then we expected them
to be disinclined to use a partial rating such as “sort of” or “very much”, and to stick
to the two extreme responses—“not at all” or “completely”. In the event our
manipulation of context had no effect on this measure either.
In the light of these results, it would appear that instability and disagreement in
categorization is not exclusively driven by a lack of specificity in the context.
Whether simply classifying, trying to capture common categorization practices, or
yet advising a technical committee on the correct way to classify, people rely on the
same underlying conceptual representation and this is best described in terms of a
typicality gradient.
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Typicality is a measure that has had wide use in Psychology, but its relation to
semantics is often rather obscure, and subject to misunderstanding. In the next
section I therefore discuss in detail just what typicality is measuring, and how it
relates to issues of semantics.
1.5 Typicality and Gradedness
In Hampton (2007) I define a position on the relation of typicality to graded
categorization. In the Threshold Model I propose that a semantic category is rep-
resented by a set of intensional information in the form of a prototype (which may
include schematic structure about causal-explanatory links between features).
Potential exemplars can be ranked in terms of their similarity to this prototype, as
determined by an asymmetric measure of how well the exemplar matches the
prototype features. For example, similarity of a tomato to fruit will be greater on
this measure than the similarity of fruit to tomato. It is assumed that tomato matches
more features of fruit than fruit matches features of tomato because of the greater
abstraction of fruit.
The ranking based on similarity then provides the basis for judgments of typi-
cality (assuming other factors are held constant—see below), and also provides the
basis for categorization decisions through the application of a criterion or threshold.
With the additional assumption that the placement of the threshold is subject to
normally distributed error both within and across individuals, a standard psycho-
metric function is obtained relating the probability of a positive categorization to the
underlying similarity.
It is perhaps common in some parts of the Cognitive Science community (e.g.
Armstrong et al. 1983; Fodor 1998; Osherson and Smith 1981, 1982, 1997) to
dismiss typicality effects as purely psychological and hence peripheral to the
development of lexical semantic theory. After all, we know that the way in which
the mind stores words in the mental lexicon shows all kinds of psychological
influences that are orthogonal to issues of lexical meaning. Frequency of a word in
the language, for example, has large effects on reading, memory and a range of
other cognitive tasks. It has also been found that the degree to which words are
associated (like “Fish” and “Chips” in the UK) can be highly predictive of a range
of phenomena. Why should not typicality effects be of the same kind?
I will argue that when people judge typicality (for example of an item in a
category) they may be judging quite a number of different things. Nonetheless
paramount among those different dimensions is similarity to a prototype repre-
senting the common intensional properties of the class. Because this measure of
similarity also determines the degree to which an item can be said to belong in a
category, typicality ratings do an excellent job of predicting the likelihood that an
item will be placed in a category as evidenced in the Hampton et al. (2006)
experiments, and many other similar studies.
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1.6 Does Variation in Typicality Really Undermine
the Classical Model?
Any description of the impact of Rosch’s prototype theory on the psychology of
concepts tends to make much of typicality effects. The classical theory against
which Rosch was arguing proposed that a concept could be defined intensionally as
a conjunction of individually necessary and jointly sufficient features. A concept
such as “bachelor” could be defined as “human, male, adult, and eligible to marry”.
It has been claimed by supporters of the prototype model that this classical theory
gives equal status to all items that meet the definition, so there should be no
differences between items in terms of how well they represent the class. Although
often repeated, I do not take this to be a fair criticism of the classical model.
Typicality can reflect many different underlying structural variables, many of which
do not relate to the question of whether a concept term applies to an exemplar. It is
important therefore to tease apart the different influences on typicality to get a clear
picture of the role that it plays in conceptual structure.
First, the notion of typicality or goodness-of-example is often confounded with
other non-semantic dimensions such as familiarity (Malt and Smith 1982). Indeed
Armstrong et al. (1983) demonstrated that well-defined categories such as Odd and
Even Numbers have clear typicality structure, most probably based on simplicity
and familiarity (but see Larochelle et al. 2000, for counter-evidence). (Of course,
the demonstration that well-defined categories show typicality effects does nothing
to undermine the theory that for other types of categories, lacking an explicit
definition, typicality may be a critical factor in determining membership.)
Second, it has been suggested that category membership is determined by a
defining core of features, whereas additional “characteristic” features are associated
with typicality differences (Osherson and Smith 1981; Rey 1983; Smith et al.
1974). In support of this proposal, Rips (1989) presented a variety of attempts to
dissociate measures of similarity, typicality and category membership, in which it is
claimed that some item may be more typical of category A than of category B, even
though it is a better member of B than of A. His results have however not stood up
well under replication (Hampton et al. 2007; Smith and Sloman 1994).
Given that Typicality effects on their own do not provide strong evidence against
the classical model, what do we know about their basis?
1.7 Ingredients of Typicality 1: Ideals
It has been shown (e.g. Barsalou 1985) that when people are asked to say how
typical an item is as a member of a category, then they are influenced by several
different dimensions. First and foremost, Typicality ratings are assumed to be a pure
measure of the underlying similarity in meaning, or degree of match of semantic
features, between a member and its superordinate category. This dimension of
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similarity is clearly a major influence on Typicality ratings. However other factors
are also involved. Barsalou (1985) showed that in addition to what he termed
Central Tendency (closeness of a concept to the centre of its category), ratings of
Typicality were also correlated with frequency of instantiation (a measure of
familiarity) and matching of Ideals. An ideal is a feature of a concept that represents
extreme rather than average values of a dimension. Thus a winter coat may be
considered most typical if it is ideally warm and light, as opposed to being closest to
the average winter coat (which will be of average warmth and average weight).
So Typicality per se must be interpreted with this ambiguity in mind. The
ambiguity has been made a lot worse by Rosch’s (1975) original characterization of
typicality as “goodness-of-example”, a term also used in Barsalou (1985). Barsalou
notes that the word “typicality” was not used in his study because it could bias
participants into thinking of frequency of instantiation. As a consequence, he asked
for goodness-of-example, with a scale running from “poor example” to “excellent
example”. Similarly, Burnett et al. (2005) concluded that expert fishermen judged
the typicality of types of fish based on ideals, while using “goodness of example” as
their measure of typicality. The difficulty here is that asking about “goodness” leads
to an evaluative judgment and hence allows ideals to have a greater influence on the
judgments.
There have been very few attempts to distinguish between the two senses of
typicality. One exception is Kittur et al. (2006) who dissociated the two dimensions
using a novel relational concept learned in the laboratory. They found that ratings of
goodness of example reflected just ideals, whereas typicality judgments reflected
both ideals and central tendencies.
One way to understand the relation of typicality and ideals would be to propose
that ideals should be understood as contributing to typicality itself which then
determines degrees of membership. In this way, typicality would mediate the
influence of ideals on category membership. This proposal needs empirical testing.
In an experimental manipulation of ideals, Kim and Murphy (2011) demonstrated
that in fact ideal exemplars that best served a category’s goals were not necessarily
perceived as most typical. For example, a great party might be considered ideal, but
was not judged as typical.
1.8 Ingredients of Typicality 2: Frequency and Familiarity
As well as Ideals, Barsalou (1985) also identified Frequency of Instantiation as a
component of Typicality. Participants were asked to judge subjectively how often a
category member occurred as an instantiation of the category. Allied to this measure
is a second measure: Category Dominance. Going back to the early days of asso-
ciationist psychology, the measure of Category Dominance is the relative frequency
with which an item is generated when people are asked to list all the category
members that come to mind within a limited time (Battig and Montague 1969).
A third measure related to frequency of instantiation is familiarity, in which
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participants rate items in terms of how familiar they seem. These different measures
tend to correlate together and to form a separate dimension from typicality owing to
family resemblance or similarity (Barsalou 1985; Hampton and Gardiner 1983).
Hampton (1997a) was able to show a double dissociation of the effects of
Typicality and Category Dominance on response times and errors when people
make speeded categorization decisions. In a first experiment, regression methods
were used to differentiate the effects of typicality, familiarity and category domi-
nance on the average time to categorize items, and the likelihood of making a
positive response. Participants were given a category (e.g. Fruit) and then a list of
words one at a time. They had to make a speeded decision for each word whether it
belonged in the category or not. Mean reaction time was predicted in a multiple
regression equation using norms for semantic categories collected by Hampton and
Gardiner (1983). (Hampton and Gardiner 1983, used instructions for typicality that
explicitly differentiated it from frequency of instantiation.) Likelihood of a Yes
response was also predicted. The results showed that typicality and category
dominance each made independent and significant contributions to predicting
decision time. Although the two measures were correlated with each other, the
speed in making a decision was driven both by the availability of the item in
memory (as measured by category dominance) and by the similarity of the item to
the category (as measured by typicality). When it came to response probability,
only typicality predicted the likelihood of a Yes or No response.
The second experiment introduced two manipulations. First, manipulating the
difficulty of the task by including closely related false items (e.g. a bat is a bird)
slowed down atypical items relative to typical items, but had no effect on items as a
function of their category dominance. A second manipulation in which half the
items were seen in a different context before having to be categorized showed that
the category dominance effect but not the typicality effect was eliminated by earlier
exposure of the items. Taken together the results all suggest that while high
dominance items are more readily available in memory, the actual decision of
whether something is in a category is just affected by its typicality and not by
associative strength. There is an interesting parallel here with the heuristics of
Availability and Representativeness proposed by Tversky and Kahneman to explain
people’s judgments of probability (Kahneman et al. 1982).
1.9 Typicality and Membership
Having described the multiple influences on typicality, including the ambiguity of
what it is to be a “good” example, and the confounding with familiarity and
category dominance, what is the evidence that there is nonetheless a purer notion of
typicality that should be taken seriously as a component of meaning? The results of
the study by Hampton et al. (2006) described above provide one such piece of
evidence. Here we had eight categories in which there was uncertainty or vagueness
in the classification of borderline items. Moreover, the basis of the disagreement
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and inconsistency did not come down to mere ignorance. There is no fact of the
matter or correct answer to these borderline categorization cases. In that respect
they can be termed an example of Vagueness, with similar properties to the tra-
ditional cases of vagueness seen in adjectives like red, bald or tall. Being bald is a
matter of degree, so that it is meaningless to ask exactly how many hairs need to be
lost before someone is correctly termed bald. In the same way, many noun cate-
gories have membership which is a matter of degree (sociology may be considered
a better science than palm-reading) but there is no hard and fast way to determine
who is right and who is wrong in the event of a borderline dispute. We come back
again to the dispute about bridge being a sport. With due respect to the UK
Supreme Court, there is no higher authority to which one can turn to decide the
question in an objective fashion (as there might be in the case of a biological or
technical term). As in matters of taste, it appears that each may be entitled to his/her
own opinion about such cases (Wright 1995).
It is in the context of this vagueness in noun meanings that the notion of
Typicality can be helpful. Disputes about borderline cases often end up with party
A arguing “X is a sport because it has features D, E and F”, while party B argues “X
is not a sport because it lacks features P, Q and R”. But this is exactly what the
“pure” notion of Typicality captures—the fact that the more features of a concept an
item possesses the more justified one is in placing it in the category. There is a
continuity between one category member being more typical of a category because
it has more matching features (as in the case of a robin being a more typical bird
than an ostrich, even though both are clearly birds) and one item being more likely
to be classed as a member of a category than another for the same reason (as in
ten-pin bowling being considered more of a sport than billiards.)
This is a critical point for the debate between formal semantics and psychology.
If typicality is a purely psychological phenomenon that does not affect truth values
(as in the robin versus ostrich case) then it is safe for semantics to ignore it and
instead to focus on category membership (a position taken among others by Osh-
erson and Smith 1997). However when other conceptual categories are considered,
it turns out that variation in typicality (as determined by similarity to a prototype or
by the degree to which something possesses the prototypical features) does affect
truth values. In the Hampton et al. (2006) experiments we showed again and again
that rated typicality was the best predictor of people’s judgments of truth for sen-
tences such as “seaweed is a vegetable”, “a tomato is a fruit”, “a squid is a fish” or
“a piano is a kind of furniture”.
In Hampton (2007) I argued therefore for a single underlying dimension that in
the first place determines how typical some item is of its class (in the family
resemblance sense of typical, rather than anything involving ideals or familiarity),
and in the second place determines how much of a member of the class it is. This
underlying dimension relates to the degree to which the conceptual representation
of the item brought to mind in the given task context matches that of the super-
ordinate category that it is being compared to.
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To develop this model, the notion of Typicality has to be extended or adapted a
little further. Linguistically speaking, to say that X is a typical (or atypical) Y
carries the presupposition that X is indeed a Y. One would probably not say that a
bat is an atypical bird. It may resemble a bird but that doesn’t make it an atypical
one. However in the original introduction of typicality ratings as “goodness-of-
example” Rosch (1975) also chose to ignore this refinement and asked participants
to judge typicality across a full range of items running from typical exemplars
through borderline cases to clear non-examples. Adapting to the pragmatics of the
task, her participants duly obliged, and so Typicality also has an extended meaning
corresponding to something like “typicality if it is a member and closeness to the
category if it is not”.
In a number of papers, (Hampton 1979; Hampton and Gardiner 1983; Hampton
1988b) I developed a graded membership scale based on this more explicit notion
which was then used in the studies of concept conjunction negation and disjunction
described above. As discussed above, the key result of those studies was that
membership in a conjunctively defined category showed a continuous gradation (in
terms of the probability of a positive response) that was highly predictable in a
regression from degree of membership in the two constituents. Furthermore, just as
typicality in a conjunction is known to sometimes surpass typicality in a conjunct
(the guppy as a pet fish is the example proposed by Osherson and Smith 1981), so
membership in a conjunction can surpass membership in a conjunct.
This phenomenon of overextension has been demonstrated most recently in a
study of activity verbs by Martin Jönsson. Jönsson (2015) showed people videos of
an actor simultaneously performing two actions, such as Smoking and Walking.
The action would be a typical example of the first action (e.g. smoking) but a very
atypical example of the second (e.g. walking). The task asked for a Yes/No answer
to simple questions such as “Is this man smoking?”, “Is this man walking?” or “Is
this man smoking and walking?”. Jönsson found with this particular example that
100% answered yes to the first question, and only 39% answered yes to the second.
However 70% answered yes to the conjunctive question. It appears that likelihood
of agreeing to classification in a conjunction may involve an average of perceived
degrees of membership in each conjunct, rather than the likelihood of believing that
the item is in the first category and also believing that the item is in the second.
A crucial test of the involvement of Typicality in categorization judgments is to
show that variation of typicality among cases which are clearly members of a
category can nonetheless affect categorization in a conjunction. Suppose that an
item is clearly a member of one category, but is on the borderline for another. For
example, suppose that everyone agrees that Jack is bald (about half his head is
hairless) but only 50% agree that he is tall. Then the composite prototype account
would predict that increasing Jack’s degree of baldness yet further would com-
pensate for his lack of tallness and make it more likely that people would accept
that he is both bald and tall.
This prediction of compensation between typicality in one category and mem-
bership in a conjunction was tested in Hampton (1996). People made a set of three
judgments about cartoon faces representing a range of age from child to adult and a
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range of emotion from happy to sad. Critical test items were clearly either children
or adults, but differed in typicality in those categories. At the same time these test
faces were borderline in terms of emotion. The study showed, for example, that
variability in the typicality of a given adult face influenced the likelihood of cat-
egorization in a conjunction such as “happy adult”. Thus typicality of a face as an
adult face could compensate for borderline membership as a happy face and affect
the categorization in the conjunction.
1.10 Differentiating Vagueness from Ignorance
A recent paper (Hampton et al. 2012) shows that the ontological uncertainty about
whether (say) bridge is a sport can be differentiated from other kinds of uncertainty
based on ignorance. In a set of studies we looked at the problem of higher order
vagueness. The basic set up was as follows. Two groups of people had to judge
whether a list of items belonged in a category, and as previously, the list was
designed to contain many borderline or disputable items. The procedure required
them to return after two weeks and to perform the task again (as in McCloskey and
Glucksberg 1978). We measured the likelihood that they would give the same
response on each occasion—a measure we labelled as Consistency. In the first
group who responded simply Yes or No, people would typically maintain the same
response for about 80% of items. People in the second group, rather than saying
simply Yes or No, were given the chance to create a third, middle, response
category. They were instructed to first decide if the item was 100% certain to be in
the category, or 100% certain to be NOT in the category, and respond accordingly.
Any item for which they were not 100% sure, they were told to put in a middle
response category of “Not 100% sure”. As for the first group, we measured con-
sistency of responding.
Our original intuition was that this second condition would lead to greater
consistency. As people could “cherry pick” the easy items and leave the others
aside, and as they would be given credit for being consistent if they put an item in
the “Not 100% sure” category both times, we felt that they would change their
minds much less often. In fact, the results were quite clear in showing that the
likelihood of changing your mind about whether something is 100% certain to be in
a category is no more nor less than the likelihood of being inconsistent in judging if
it is in the category or not. Higher order vagueness (determining the boundaries of
the vague region where things are unsure) turned out to be just the same as lower
order vagueness (the indecision within the vague region).
This effect can be used to argue that vagueness about category membership is
not equivalent to uncertainty owing to ignorance. In different versions of the task,
we tried the same procedure with general knowledge statements. Instead of a
statement such as “rhubarb is a fruit” we had statements like “The Uruguayan flag
has red in it”. Now, the second group who were allowed to say when they were
unsure were significantly more consistent in their responses. After several other
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studies, including both those in the paper and other unpublished studies done since,
we can conclude that when there is an objective truth to a statement (as in general
knowledge, or as in the correct meaning of a word, or as in memory for a video)
then people can reliably identify the statements that they “know they don’t know”.
On the other hand, when the truth of a statement has a more subjective basis, as in
categorization but also as in personal judgments about one’s aspirations, moral
beliefs or early childhood memories, then one cannot do so. In these cases, asking
people to only say “yes” when they are definitely sure simply moves the decision
criterion to a higher level but does nothing to reduce the inherent unreliability of the
decision.
A recent unpublished study, conducted with Shauna-Kaye Williams demon-
strates this effect with a single dimensional example of vagueness. We had two sets
of faces which varied according to their emotional expression. The first were a set of
morphs between a neutral expression and a happy expression. The second were
morphed between a neutral expression and a surprised expression. In a first session,
participants went through each set of faces twice, once deciding if the faces were
happy or not, or surprised or not (depending on the set), and once deciding if they
were clearly happy or not, or clearly surprised or not. They returned for a second
session a week later, and repeated the task. In this case, we were interested in
whether asking people only to respond positively if the faces were “clearly”
showing the emotion would lead to a sharper boundary and more consistent
responding over time. In fact, neither of these occurred. Figure 1 shows the results
where logistic regression functions were fit to each individual’s data and then a plot
made based on the average slope and threshold. In both sets of faces, the
requirement to select faces that clearly showed the expression simply moved the
threshold to the right, while leaving the sharpness of the boundary unaffected. (In
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Fig. 1 Logistic functions fit to the likelihood of a positive categorization as a function of the
morphed scale of emotional intensity for happy or clearly happy faces (left) and surprised or
clearly surprised faces (right)
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1.11 Concept Intensions as Fundamental
I have hoped to show that there are a number of phenomena that argue for a
fundamental role for intensional representations of concepts as the raw components
of thoughts. My research into conjunctions of prototype concepts shows that people
are not particularly concerned to respect the logic that requires that to be in a
conjunction means to be in each of the conjuncts. Likewise there is good evidence
that neither disjunction nor negation fares any better in terms of maintaining logical
norms (Hampton 1988a, 1997b). To account for these deviations from logic, it is
most fruitful to look at how intensions might be combined in different ways to form
conjunctive, negated or disjunctive concepts (Hampton et al. 2012). The Composite
Prototype Model (CPM, Hampton 1987, 1988b) details how we might account for
the results through a process of integrating two prototype concepts into a single
composite to represent the complex concept. As Pelletier (2017) describes it, this is
compositionality as applied to prototypes. We know that prototypes for conjunc-
tions (e.g. pet birds) may look quite different from those of their conjuncts (pets and
birds considered separately). As described above, the model suggests an initial
process of attempting to combine the two concepts by taking the disjunction of their
features. This is followed by the identification of points of incompatibility and
either the deletion of certain features (pet birds do not migrate in winter) and/or the
addition of new emergent features not seen in either concept (pet birds live in cages
though neither birds nor pets do normally).
In order to explore the process of conceptual combination in a “pure” state,
without the influence of prior familiarity, Hampton (1997c) described a study in
which people were required to describe conjunctions of categories which do not
currently exist, such as a computer that was also a kind of teacup, or a vehicle that
was also a kind of fish. Why set people such a task? I was primarily interested in
demonstrating that concept intensions are flexible and adaptable. Just as when
forming the concept of Pet Fish one must abandon some salient features of each
concept (we don’t eat pet fish with French fries, and nor do they cuddle on our
laps), so when truly incompatible conjunctions need to be imagined the process can
be taken to extremes. Figure 2 shows an example of one of the solutions offered by
Fig. 2 A bird that is a
kitchen utensil. Redrawn from
original drawing of an
anonymous participant
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the more creative participants, in response to the requirement to find a bird that was
also a kitchen utensil. In this case a woodpecker has been trained to whisk eggs
using its powerful head movements.
Qualitative analysis of the results of this first pilot study showed some very
interesting principles were involved in combining concepts. First, there was evi-
dence for instantiation of superordinate categories to basic level categories—birds
became woodpeckers, fruit bananas, and furniture couches. Second, people would
align properties and functions between the two concepts. The example given here
shows how the need to find a function for a kitchen utensil is met by finding a
behavior of a particular bird that can serve the function of a particular utensil. Third,
there was evidence for simulation processes, in line with Barsalou’s suggestions
about the role of concepts in achieving goals (Barsalou 1991). Commentary pro-
vided by the creator of the woodpecker whisk pointed out that it would not need
electrical power (good for camping trips) but would on the other hand be unhy-
gienic. The use of simulation takes the specification of the combined concept and
develops it in totally non-compositional directions, as the new concept is adapted to
real world knowledge. Finally, many solutions identified conflicting properties in
the newly combined concept, and offered new emergent features to resolve them.
For example, when a participant solved “A fruit that is also a kind of furniture” by
proposing a banana couch, they went on to specify that the banana had been
modified to grow very large and to ripen very slowly.
Extensional accounts of meaning focus on the sets of exemplars in the world. As
such they can have nothing to say about concepts which have no members. (The
problem of empty and fictional names is well known, Braun 2005). Thus when we
think about counter-factual or hypothetical objects, the extension has to be taken to
refer not to the actual world but to a virtual or “possible” world. Computer teacups
do not currently exist, but it is possible to imagine an alternative world in which
they do, and we can speculate about their properties. In fact this process of con-
ceptual combination may be a key factor in innovation and creativity.
In a recent paper (Gibbert et al. 2012) my colleagues and I investigated cre-
ativity in the forming of concepts of hybrid products—artifacts that serve more than
one traditional function. In direct agreement with the processes postulated by the
Composite Prototype Model we showed how first attempts to imagine (say) a
pillow that was also a telephone would simply aggregate the features of the two
concepts into a composite. However when the two concepts being combined were
sufficiently dissimilar, then a second attempt at combining the concepts would
generate integrative solutions in which features of one concept would be aligned
with those of the other to provide emergent functionality. The telephone could be
programmed to provide gentle sounds to help people get to sleep, or the pillow
could gently move to alert the user that a phone call was arriving. A less kind
proposal was that the pillow would allow one to nap while listening to one’s mother
on the phone. When people were able to generate integrative solutions, these were
consistently judged to be more likely to succeed as marketable products.
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1.12 Impossible Objects and Hierarchical Levels
To conclude this chapter I will describe a study in this project, conducted with
Diane Lewis and Zachary Estes in which we looked more specifically at the issue of
instantiation. We designed a study in which half the concepts were basic level
categories (Rosch et al. 1976) corresponding to the most common names for
objects, like CAR and LEMON and the other half were superordinate categories
like VEHICLE or FRUIT, where there is no single image than can be formed of the
category as a whole.1 We had two ideas in mind about how this variable would
affect the likely success of forming incompatible conjunctions. On the one hand,
superordinate categories place fewer constraints on the solution. For an object to be
a car requires some minimum description in terms of shape, size and material which
need not be true for something to be a vehicle. We therefore predicted that in
general our participants would find it easier to combine disjoint sets at the super-
ordinate level, leading to Superordinate-Superordinate combinations being the
easiest to form, Basic-Basic combinations to be hardest, and mixed combinations in
between. As a rider to this hypothesis, we also considered it likely that successful
use of Superordinate concepts would be found greatest when they were actually
instantiated in the solution as familiar basic level concepts.
Set against this prediction was the possibility that because basic objects are very
familiar and easily imagined, there would be some processing advantage to having
the task set at this concrete level. Indeed there is evidence (Smits et al. 2002) that
people actually make decisions about superordinate categories by retrieving
prominent basic level exemplars. In particular, we felt that a case could be made for
arguing that the mixed conditions Superordinate-Basic and Basic-Superordinate
would be the easiest. In these conditions one of the concepts would be anchored to a
familiar and concrete basic level object, and the task would then be to modify or
transform this easily imagined object in order to meet the criteria of the other
superordinate category in some way.
The design was a 2 × 2 within subjects design manipulating whether the first
and second nouns were basic or superordinate concepts. Thirty-two students and
other young adults (18 female) aged 17–32, completed booklets. Eight sets of items
were constructed. Each set was a quadruple of a pair of basic level concepts to be
combined, together with their superordinates. Table 2 lists the materials used.
A combination was created by taking one of the nouns from the left two columns
and combining it with one of the nouns from the same row in the right two columns.
There were thus four possible combinations for each quadruple, such as
Banana-Bus, Banana-Vehicle, Fruit-Bus and Fruit-Vehicle.
Each participant was given two pairs in each of the four conditions, and the
materials were rotated through the four conditions across four groups of participants
1Some of our superordinate concepts, like Bird and Fish were probably at the basic level in terms
of Rosch et al.’s (1976) criteria. However the manipulation of level was still valid with “Wood-
pecker” providing greater constraints on a combined concept than “Bird”.
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so that each quadruple contributed equally to all conditions. The first nouns were
always the Head nouns, and the second the Modifiers in a phrase such as “A banana
that is also a bus”.
1.13 Results
Responses were rated by two independent judges on scales of success (1–10) and
symmetry (rescaled for analysis as 1 = bias towards head, 0 = no bias, −1 = bias
towards modifier). Reliabilities were estimated by the Spearman Brown method as
0.70 for success ratings and 0.75 for symmetry. Raters disagreed by more than 4
scale points for the success rating on only 5% of occasions, and gave opposing
symmetry judgments also on only 5% of occasions.
Success. Figure 3 shows the mean rated success of solutions as a function of the
level of the head and modifier concepts. Problems involving superordinate terms
were more successfully solved than those involving basic level terms, both for the
head noun (5.8 vs. 5.4) and for the modifier noun (5.8 vs. 5.5). ANOVA confirmed
independent significant main effects of level for the head noun (F(1, 31) = 6.9,
Table 2 Materials used in
the experiment for forming
“impossible” combinations of
concepts
First noun Second noun
Basic Superordinate Basic Superordinate
Banana Fruit Bus Vehicle
Woodpecker Bird Jumper Clothing
Shark Fish Daffodil Flower
Table Furniture Mosquito Insect
Bomb Weapon Carrot Vegetable
Snake Reptile Bungalow Building
Horse Mammal Spanner Tool














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Basic Modifier Superordinate Modifier
Fig. 3 Success of solutions
as a function of level of the
head and modifier nouns
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p < 0.05, and for the modifier noun (F(1, 31) = 4.55, p < 0.05), with no significant
interaction (F < 1).
Symmetry. Analysis of the Symmetry judgements showed that solutions tended
to be more similar to the head noun than the modifier (mean bias = 0.14, SD =
0.54, t(127) = 2.84, p < 0.005), but there were no effects of level. This result
suggests that the head noun may be taken as a starting point and modified in the
direction of the modifier, rather than vice versa.
Instantiation. The significant effects of level on success were in keeping with the
prediction that the greater flexibility allowed to the participant from the use of a
superordinate would allow better solutions to be found. To test this notion further
we examined the interaction between success and the amount of instantiation used
in a solution.
Solutions for the conditions involving superordinates (Basic-Superordinate,
Superordinate-Basic and Superordinate-Superordinate) were divided on the basis of
whether either the head or modifier superordinate was clearly instantiated as a
particular basic level term. Some of the 16 superordinate categories were almost
always instantiated (notably furniture, fruit, mammal, pet, vehicle) whereas others
were almost never instantiated (flower, fish). The likelihood of a superordinate
concept being instantiated was greater (72%) when the other concept was also
superordinate, than when the other was a basic level term (59%), so it appears that
finding a solution is easier if at least one of the terms is at the basic level or has
been instantiated at the basic level.
Average success of solutions was compared for cases where the superordinate(s)
were instantiated and cases where they were not. For this purpose instantiation was
treated as a Post Hoc Factor. For the conditions with one Basic and one Superor-
dinate concept, instantiation of the superordinate had a relatively small effect (mean
success = 6.0 instantiated, 5.4 un-instantiated, t(126) = 1.97, p = 0.051).
However for the Superordinate-Superordinate condition, instantiation had a
sizeable effect on success. Where neither was instantiated (13 out of 64 cases),
mean success was only 4.3, whereas when either one or both were instantiated it
rose to 6.3. Because of small cell sizes, a one-way ANOVA was conducted com-
paring three levels of instantiation—both nouns instantiated, just one instantiated,
or neither noun instantiated. There was a strong effect of instantiation (F(2,
61) = 6.1, p < 0.005). Figure 4 illustrates some of the more successful solutions
offered.
What has been shown by these explorations of the creative potential in our
conceptual system? Clearly the primary function of words and sentences is to
enable us to communicate and coordinate our thoughts about the world. Lexical
items have a dictionary meaning that provides a firm basis for learning a language
and using it effectively across a range of social contexts. At the same time, the
concepts that constitute the basis of those meanings are capable of showing a
flexibility that is fundamental to the process of invention and conceptual change. To
understand how lexical composition occurs it helps to understand more about how
conceptual contents can be combined. That process would appear to require access
to the full repertoire of human cognitive capacities, well beyond the limits of a set
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of compositional rules applied to a finite set of fixed concepts. In particular it may
require active simulation of concepts in an imagined world (Barsalou, 2017) and
access to knowledge of the world (Murphy and Medin 1985).
2 Conclusions
In this chapter I have tried to provide some hard evidence that lexical meanings are
often concepts that are constituted as prototypes in the mind of the language user.
The prototype consists of a set of correlated features that represent what people
know and expect about the most typical or representative example of the kind, and
the amount of variability that can be expected around that. Because these concepts
lack hard definitions, it is common to find borderline disputes about meaning.
Furthermore when modelling the way in which people interpret apparently con-
junctive phrases such as “an A which is a B” it is necessary to take account of these
prototype intensions in order to explain the patterns of overextension and com-
pensation that occur, together with other effects such as non-commutativity and
category dominance.
Fig. 4 Examples of the successful solutions generated by the more creative participants.
Clockwise from top left a horse which is a tool, a bird which is clothing, a pet which is a musical
instrument, and a reptile which is a building. Instantiation, alignment and emergent features are
evident in these solutions. Original drawings of anonymous participants have been redrawn
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I hope also to have provided an explanation of why typicality should not be
taken as a unitary measure, since as a task it can invite a range of different prag-
matic interpretations, including ideals and familiarity as well as the intended one of
representativeness.
Let me conclude with some comments about the relation of this work to the
work of formal semantics as described in the chapter in this volume by Pelletier. It
is perfectly true that the work I have described offers no account of the difference
between individuals and kinds, no account of how the scope of quantifiers is
determined from syntax and no account of indefinitely many other linguistic and
semantic phenomena. That was never its aim. The focus on intersective noun
combinations was primarily to demonstrate that you need intensions to explain
people’s intuitions of applicability in these cases. There is a large psychological
literature on other forms of conceptual combination involving noun-noun com-
pounds (Wisniewski 1997; Gagne and Shoben 1997; Estes and Glucksberg 2000)
showing that intersective interpretations are relatively rare compared to a number of
other commonly used thematic relations such as “MADE OF” (e.g. CHOCOLATE
EGG), “LOCATED IN” (e.g. CITY BUS) or “USED FOR” (e.g. CEMENT
TRUCK). The question is therefore whether the two distinct approaches to
semantics can find a way to mesh, or whether there are fundamental incompati-
bilities between them. A problem of finding the right conceptual combination.
References
Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman, H. (1983). What some concepts might not be.
Cognition, 13, 263–308.
Barsalou, L. W. (1991). Deriving categories to achieve goals. The Psychology of Learning and
Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, 27, 1–64.
Barsalou, L. W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as determinants of
graded structure in categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 11, 629–654.
Barsalou, L.W. (2017). Cognitively plausible theories of concept composition. In J. A. Hampton &
Y.Winter (Eds.), Compositionality and concepts in linguistics and psychology (pp. 9–30).
Berlin: Springer.
Battig, W. F., & Montague, W. E. (1969). Category norms for verbal items in 56 categories: A
replication and extension of the Connecticut category norms. Journal of Experimental
Psychology Monograph, 80(3, part 2).
Bowerman, M., & Choi, S. (2003a). Space under construction: Language specific spatial
categorization in first language acquisition. In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.),
Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and cognition (pp. 387–428).
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bowerman, M., & Choi, S. (2003b). Space under construction: Language specific spatial
categorization in first language acquisition. In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.),
Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought. Cambridge MA: MIT
Press.
Braun, D. (2005). Empty names, fictional names, mythical names. Noûs, 39, 596–631.
Burnett, R., Medin, D., Ross, N., & Blok, S. (2005). Ideal is typical. Canadian Journal of
Psychology, 59, 3–10.
118 J.A. Hampton
Davies, Caroline (2015). High court ruling paves way for courts to decide whether bridge is a
sport. The Guardian, 27/04/2015.
Estes, Z., & Glucksberg, S. (2000). Interactive property attribution in concept combination.
Memory and Cognition, 28, 28–34.
Fodor, J. A. (1998). Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Fodor, J. A., & Lepore, E. (2002). The compositionality papers. Oxford University Press.
Gagné, C. L., & Shoben, E. J. (1997). Influence of thematic relations on the comprehension of
Modifier-Noun combinations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory, and
Cognition, 23, 71–87.
Gibbert, M., Hampton, J. A., Estes, Z., & Mazursky, D. (2012). The curious case of the
refrigerator-TV: Similarity and hybridization. Cognitive Science, 36, 992–1018.
Goodenough, W. H. (1965). Yankee kinship terminology: A problem in componential analysis.
American Anthropologist, New Series, 67(5), 259–287.
Hampton, J. A. (1979). Polymorphous concepts in semantic memory. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior, 18, 441–461.
Hampton, J. A. (1987). Inheritance of attributes in natural concept conjunctions. Memory &
Cognition, 15, 55–71.
Hampton, J. A. (1988a). Disjunction of natural concepts. Memory & Cognition, 16, 579–591.
Hampton, J. A. (1988b). Overextension of conjunctive concepts: Evidence for a unitary model of
concept typicality and class inclusion. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 14, 12–32.
Hampton, J. A. (1996). Conjunctions of visually-based categories: Overextension and compen-
sation. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22, 378–396.
Hampton, J. A. (1997a). Associative and similarity-based processes in categorization decisions.
Memory & Cognition, 25, 625–640.
Hampton, J. A. (1997b). Conceptual combination: Conjunction and negation of natural concepts.
Memory & Cognition, 25, 888–909.
Hampton, J. A. (1997c). Emergent attributes in combined concepts. In T. B. Ward, S. M. Smith, &
J. Viad (Eds.), Creative thought: An investigation of conceptual structures and processes
(pp. 83–110). Washington DC: American Psychological Association Press.
Hampton, J. A. (1998). Similarity-based categorization and fuzziness of natural categories.
Cognition, 65, 137–165.
Hampton, J. A. (2007). Typicality, graded membership and vagueness. Cognitive Science, 31,
355–383.
Hampton, J. A., Aina, B., Andersson, J. M., Mirza, H., & Parmar, S. (2012). The Rumsfeld effect:
The unknown unknown. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 38, 340–355.
Hampton, J. A., Dubois, D., & Yeh, W. (2006). The effects of pragmatic context on classification
in natural categories. Memory & Cognition, 34, 1431–1443.
Hampton, J. A., Estes, Z., & Simmons, S. (2007). Metamorphosis: Essence, appearance and
behavior in the categorization of natural kinds. Memory & Cognition, 35, 1785–1800.
Hampton, J. A., & Gardiner, M. M. (1983). Measures of internal category structure: A
correlational analysis of normative data. British Journal of Psychology, 74, 491–516.
Johnson, K. (2004). On the systematicity of language and thought. The Journal of Philosophy, 101
(3), 111–139.
Jönsson, M. L. (2015). Overextension in verb conjunctions. Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(6), 1917–1922.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kim, S., & Murphy, G. L. (2011). Ideals and category typicality. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(5), 1092–1112.
Kittur, A., Holyoak, K. J., & Hummel, J. E. (2006). Ideals aren’t always typical: Dissociating
goodness-of-exemplar from typicality judgments. In R. Sun & N. Miyake (Eds.), Proceedings
Compositionality and Concepts 119
of the Twenty-eighth Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 429–434). Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Landau, B. (1982). Will the real grandmother please stand up? The psychological reality of dual
meaning representations. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 11(1), 47–62.
Larochelle, S., Richard, S., & Soulières, I. (2000). What some effects might not be: The time to
verify membership in “well-defined” categories. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy, A, 53, 929–961.
Malt, B. C., & Smith, E. E. (1982). The role of familiarity in determining typicality. Memory &
Cognition, 10, 69–75.
McCloskey, M. E., & Glucksberg, S. (1978). Natural categories: Well defined or fuzzy sets?
Memory & Cognition, 6(4), 462–472.
Murphy, G. L., & Andrew, J. M. (1993). The conceptual basis of antonymy and synonymy in
adjectives. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 301–319.
Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence.
Psychological Review, 92, 289–316.
Osherson, D. N., & Smith, E. E. (1981). On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory of
concepts. Cognition, 9(1), 35–58.
Osherson, D. N., & Smith, E. E. (1982). Gradedness and conceptual combination. Cognition, 12
(3), 299–318.
Osherson, D. N., & Smith, E. E. (1997). On typicality and vagueness. Cognition, 64, 189–206.
Pelletier, F. (2017). Compositionality and concepts—A perspective from formal semantics and
philosophy of language. In J. A. Hampton & Y. Winter (Eds.), Compositionality and concepts
in linguistics and psychology (pp. 31–94). Berlin: Springer.
Pullum, G. K., & Scholz, B. C. (2007). Systematicity and natural language syntax. Croation
Journal of Philosophy, VII(21).
Rey, G. (1983). Concepts and stereotypes. Cognition, 15, 237–262.
Rice, S. A. (1992). Polysemy and lexical representation: The case of three English prepositions. In
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 89–
94). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rips, L. J. (1989). Similarity, typicality, and categorization. In S. Vosniadou, & A. Ortony (Eds.),
Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (pp. 21–59). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive representations of semantic categories. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 104, 192–232.
Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects
in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 382–439.
Smith, E. E., & Sloman, S. A. (1994). Similarity-versus rule-based categorization. Memory and
Cognition, 22, 377–386.
Smith, E. E., Shoben, E. J., & Rips, L. J. (1974). Structure and process in semantic memory: A
feature model for semantic decisions. Psychological Review, 81, 214–241.
Smits, T., Storms, G., Rosseel, Y., & De Boeck, P. (2002). Fruits and vegetables categorized: An
application of the generalized context model. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 836–844.
Storms, G., Ruts, W., & Vandenbroucke, A. (1998). Dominance, overextensions, and the
conjunction effect in different syntactic phrasings of concept conjunctions. European Journal
of Cognitive Psychology, 10, 337–372.
Werning, M., Hintzen, W., & Machery, E. (2012). The Oxford handbook of compositionality.
Oxford University Press.
Wisniewski, E. J. (1997). When concepts combine. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4, 167–183.
Wright, C. (1995). The epistemic conception of vagueness. The Southern Journal of Philosophy,
33, 133–160.
120 J.A. Hampton
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Compositionality and Concepts 121
